SUBJECT: COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT

JULY TO OCTOBER 1971

9 October 1971

Commanding General

23d Infantry Division

ATTN: AVDF-GCHL

APO San Francisco 96217

1. NAME OF OPERATION: None

2. DATES OF OPERATION: 011200 July to 042400 October 1971.

3. LOCATION: Quang Ngai Province from the Tra Bong River south to the MRI/MRII boundary, from the South China Sea west to the Quang Ngai/Kontum provincial boundary. Map, Vietnam, 1:100,000,Series L607, Sheets 6639, 6739, 6738, 6638.

4. COMMAND AND CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 11^TH Infantry Brigade, 23d Infantry Division.

5. REPORTING OFFICER: Colonel Werner S. Goodwin, Jr., Commanding Officer 11^th Infantry Brigade, 23d Infantry Division.

6. TASK ORGANIZATION:

1 July – 1 September 1971:

11^th Infantry Brigade Control

HHC, 11^th Infantry Brigade

6-11 Artillery (DS)

D/26^th Engineers (DS)

3/B/523d Signal Battalion

Det/328^th Radio Research Unit

TM 1/635 MI Detachment

90^th Chemical Detachment

59^th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)

3-1 Infantry 1-20 Infantry

A/3-1 A/1-20

B/3-1 B/1-20

C/3-1 C/1-20

D/3-1 D/1-20

E/3-1 E/1-20

1-52 Infantry TF 23d Cavalry

A/1-52 E Trp, 1^st Cav (OPCON 198^th Bde

B/1-52 effective 29 August 1971)

C/1-52 H Trp, 17^th Cavalry

D/1-52

E/1-52

1 September – 4 October 1971

11^th Infantry Brigade Control

HHC, 11^th Infantry Brigade

6-11 Artillery (DS)

D/26^th Engineers (DS)

3/B/523 Signal Battalion

Det/328^th Radio Research Unit

TM 1/635 MI Detachment

90^th Chemical Detachment (1-11 September 1971)

59^th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) (1-13 September 1971)

H Trp, 17^th Cavalry (1-15 September 1971)

3-1 Infantry 1-20 Infantry (OPCON 198^th Bde eff 12 Sept 71)

A/3-1 A/1-20

B/3-1 B/1-20

C/3-1 C/1-20

D/3-1 D/1-20

E/3-1 E/1-20

1-52 Infantry

A/1-52

B/1-52

C/1-52

D/1-52

E/1-52

7. SUPPORTING FORCES: Artillery fire support was provided by elements of 1^st Battalion. 14^th Artillery and the 6^th Battalion, 11^th Artillery
operating in direct support of the 11^th Infantry Brigade. Elements of the 1^st Battalion, 82^nd Artillery supported the Direct Support Artillery
Battalions in the General Support Reinforcing role. Air Cavalry support was provided by B Company, 123d Aviation Battalion. Helicopter
support for combat assaults, air moves, and Support was requested thu 23d Infantry Division on an as needed basis. Air strikes were targeted
against enemy base areas, known or suspected enemy locations, and in support of ground troops in contact. Throughout the entire operation all
forms of fire support were responsive to the needs of the Brigade.

8. INTELLIGENCE: Annex A ( Intelligence)

9. MISSION: To conduct unilateral and combined operations with ARVN forces to locate and destroy the VC Quang Ngai Provincial Headquarters
and the 21^st NVA Regiment. Additionally, to assist in the GVN pacification and revolutionary development program by conducting combat
operations in conjunction with RF/PF forces to destroy VC/NVA elements and to assist in the Rice Denial Program.

10. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

Maneuver: The concept of ground operations during this reporting period remained essentially the same as in the past, except that more of the
combat role was assumed by ARVN Forces. The primary mission of US battalions was to secure fixed US positions and support the ARVN
as required. To accomplish this mission each battalion normally maintained one rifle company on it fire support base for security and three rifle
companies operating in the assigned area of operations blocking avenues of approach and infiltration. The technique of saturation patrols and
ambushes was used to restrict enemy movement throughout the Brigade TAOOI. Joint operations were conducted throughout the operational
period, with ARVN and US forces operating in close proximity to each other. Flexibility in operations was maintained through the use of combat
assaults and night movements. Rice Denial Operations were conducted in conjunction with RF/PF forces to further enhance the GVN
Pacification Program. The success of the Rice Denial program was shown by the enemy being forced to employ one entire battalion of the
21^st NVA Regiment for food production during August and September of this year.
Fires: During the operation each maneuver battalion was supported by a 105mm artillery battery in direct support. In addition, the fires of
155mm, 8 inch, and 175mm guns were available on request. When the tactical situation dictated, artillery was repositioned by road or air
movement to better support ground operations. Both tactical air and helicopter gun-ships were available to all maneuver battalions when needed.

11. EXECUTION:

1-10 July 1971: The brigade began the operation by assuming attachment of 1-52 Infantry effective 011200 July 1971. On 1 July Recon 3-1
engaged three VC at grid BS526647 resulting in one VC KIA and one 9mm pistol CIA. On 5 July B/123 AVN engaged two NVA with packs
and weapons resulting in one NVA KIA at grid BS209713.Later that day they observed and engaged three NVA at BS209712. They then
inserted the aerial rifle platoon and killed another NVA and captured one AK-47. On 6 July at BS349809 B/1-52 had a mechanical ambush
detonate resulting in one NVA KIA and one AK-47 CIA/ Recon 1-20 made contact with four VC on 8 July resulting in one VC KIA and
one law CIA, On 9 July A/1-52 engaged three NVA at BS365807 resulting in one NVA KIA. Later at BS532443 B/123 AVN engaged
and killed one NVA. B/1-20 had a mechanical ambush detonate resulting in one NVA KIA at BS663516. On 10 July B/1-52 ambushed and
killed three NVA and captured two AK-47 rifles. Snipers from 3-1 killed one VC at grid BS506746 to end the contacts for this week.

11-17 July 1971: Enemy activity remained unchanged this week with numerous small engagements being fought. On 11 July B/1-20 had a
mechanical ambush detonate resulting in one NVA KIA and one AK-47 CIA. On 13 July engaged two NVA moving vic grid BS728445
resulting in one NVA KIA and one weapon CIA. On 14 July B/123 AVN inserted the aerial rifle platoon at grid BS553432 to conduct a
BDA. They found six NVA KBAS. The platoon then made contact with unknown size enemy force resulting in five NVA KIA and one
US KIA. On 15 JULY B/123 AVN had two small engagements resulting in two NVA killed by gun-ships.

18-24 July 1971: Action picked up sharply this week with B/123 AVN making numerous contacts in the western portion of the Brigade
TAOI. On 18 July at BS275444 they engaged two NVA resulting in two NVA KIA. Also on 18 July snipers from 3-1 engaged three NVA
resulting in three NVA KIA. On 19July B/123 AVN engaged two NVA vic BS293538 resulting in two NVA KIA.TAC Air was called in
and two additional NVA were killed. Snipers from 1-52 engaged two VC at grid BS552806 killing one. On 20 July B/123 AVN engaged
six NVA vic BS161763 resulting in six NVA KIA. They inserted the aerial rifle platoon and found a large weapons and supply cache. On
21 July at BS173753 B/123 AVN engaged and killed one NVA. At BS153755, 143773, and 159750 they engaged and killed nine NVA.
Again on 22 July B/123 engaged six NVA at BS175667 resulting in six NVA KIA. D/1-52 engaged three NVA at BS161759 resulting in
one NVA KIA and one AK-47 CIA. On 23 July B/123 AVN engaged and killed ten NVA at grids BS245726, BS226722, and BS231722.
On 24 July B/123 AVN engaged 15 NVA at BS229656 resulting in 13 NVA KIA. TAC was called in and three additional NVA were killed.

25-31 July: Enemy activity remained heavy this week with B/123 AVN accounting for most of the action. On 25 July B/123 AVN had
numerous engagements with the enemy vic grid BS243740 and the total results for the day were 20 NVA KIA. On 26 July, TAC air was
employed at grid VS244646 resulting in three NVA KIA. D/1-1 Cav engaged three NVA at grid BS271664 resulting in one NVA KIA.
On 27 July the aerial rifle platoon D/1-1 Cav was inserted at grid BS193671 to check a bunker complex. They engaged and killed one NVA.
On 28 July the aerial rifle platoon from B/123 AVN found 35 boxes of medical supplies at grid BS195718. On 29 July B/123 AVN engaged
three NVA in sampan at grid BS642572 killing all three. On 30 July B/123 AVN engaged two NVA at BS217567 resulting in two
NVA KIA. B/123 AVN on 31 July Killed 23 NVA in four different engagements.

1-7 August 1971: Action in the Brigade TAOI decreased this week as the enemy forces avoided contact whenever possible. On 1 August
A/1-52 ambushed and killed one NVA at grid BS358806. On 2 August B8123 AVN engaged and killed two NVA at BS247785.
On the same day C/1-52 found one NVA KBA at grid BS354807 and A/1-52 found four NVA KBA at BS354807. On 3 August
B/123 AVN engaged and killed nine NVA at BS122496. On 4 August B/17 Cav engaged six VC at grid BS846506 resulting in three
VC KIA and one weapon CIA. B/123 AVN killed one NVA at BS133538. There were no significant actions on 6 or 7 August.

8-14 August: Action remained light for this week with B/123 accounting for most of the Brigade’s kills. On 8 August B/123 AVN engaged
and killed six NVA at grid BS202565. On 9 August E/1 Cav received a heavy volume of RPG fire at BS686535 resulting in four US WIA.
Enemy casualties were unknown. On 11 August B/123 AVN killed two NVA at BS199605. On 13 August B/123 AVN engaged and
killed eight NVA; two NVA at BS135615, one NVA Vic BS159599. TAC Air was employed at BS146599 resulting in four NVA
KBAS. C/1-52 engaged two NVA at BS215558 killing one and capturing the other. On 14 August B/123 AVN engaged and killed four
NVA at 218677.

15-21 August: Action was very light this week with the only contacts taking place on 18 and 19 August. On 18 August B/123 AVN at grid
BS751324 engaged and killed one NVA. The aerial rifle platoon was inserted and engaged five NVA, killing two. Artillery was fired resulting
in two NVA KIA. On 19 August B/3-1 and found one NVA KBA at BS753327

22-28 August: Action picked up slightly this week as the 11^th Brigade continued to conduct operations in the western portion of the TAOI.
On 22 August TAC Air was employed at BS25446 resulting in nine NVA KBAS. B/123 AVN engaged and killed two NVA at BS224868.
On 25 August FSB Snoopy received 8-10 rounds of 82mm mortar fire with negative damage. A/3-1 made contact with an unknown size
enemy force resulting in one US KIA and three US WIA. On 27 August A/3-1 again made contact with the enemy resulting in three
US WIA. Enemy casualties for both engagements are unknown.

29 August – 4 September: Action increased in the Brigade Area of operation this week as the enemy increased his activity in the TAOI.
On 30 August snipers from H/17 Cav engaged three VC at grid BS774555 killing one and capturing three weapons. On the same day
snipers from 3-1 killed one VC at grid BS537761. B/1-20 had a mechanical ambush detonate at BS673434 resulting one LOH destroyed
and two US WIA. On 1 September B/123 AVN engaged and killed one NVA at BS220608. On 2 September they killed five NVA at the
following grids: BS289693, 268693, and 109705. On 3 September TAC Air was employed at grid BS634493 resulting in one NVA KBAS.

5-11 September: Action was light this week with only three small engagements reported. On 5 September gun-ships from B/123 AVN
engaged and killed two VC at grid BS475775. Snipers from 3-1 engaged three VC at grid BS501744 killing two and wounding one.
On 11 September B/123 AVN engaged and killed seven NVA at grid bs337801. TAC Air accounted for one NVA KIA at grid BS337790.

12-18 September: On 13 September B/123 AVN engaged and killed three NVA at grid BS136749. On 14 September TAC Air was
employed at grid BS233782 resulting in four NVA KBAS. B/123 AVN engaged and killed nine NVA Vic grid BS233782. On
16 September D/3-1 made contact with an unknown size enemy force at BS334796 resulting in four US WIA. Enemy casualties
are unknown. On 17 September A/1-52 found six NVA killed by gun-ships at BS311808. B/123 AVN engaged and killed one
NVA at BS171612.

19-25 September: Action continued at a low level again this week in the 11^th Infantry Brigade TAOI> On 19 September B/123 AVN
engaged and killed one NVA at BS190624. Snipers from 3-1 Infantry at BS520750 engaged one VC/NVA resulting in one VC/NVA
KIA. The next action took place on 25 September when 176 AHC aircraft engaged and killed one VC while covering a flame drop in
MO DUC District. At grid BS592795 aircraft from 116 AHC received SAF. They returned fire resulting in five VC KIA. C/1-52 at
grid BS624522 engaged six VC/NVA resulting in three KIA and two weapons CIA.

26 September – 4 October: Action for the last week of the reporting period remained light in the Brigade’s TAOI> On 26 September
C/1-52 at grid BS630529 engaged and killed one VC and captured one SKS. On the same day B/3-1 killed one VC and captured one
AK-47 at BS611577. The only action on 27 September came at grid BS531646 when B/123 engaged and killed one VC. On
28 September B/123 AVN engaged and killed seven NVA at grids BS387803, BS236796 and 234702. On 1 October B/123
AVN engaged and killed one NVA at grid BS173702. On 2 October B/123 AVN and airstrikes accounted for nine NVA KIA
and two NVA WIA/CIA at grid BS390802. On 3 October B/123 AVN engaged and killed three NVA at grid BS502433.
Negative events on 4 October.

12. RESULTS:

a. Enemy

KIA 324

CIA 3

IWC 39

CSWC 3

b. Friendly

KIA 6

WIA (E) 93

WIA (M) 28

MIA 0

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Supply: During the period of this operation, logistical support to units’ fire support bases was accomplished by vehicle convoy and
helicopter. UH-1E helicopters were the primary aircraft used for resupplies the units in the field, however, fire support bases received
the bulk o their resupply by vehicle convoy. The exception to this was in those areas where the fire support base could not be reached
by road. The CH-47 ( Chinook was utilized for the resupply such bases. The troops in field locations were generally resupplied from
the Battalion fire support bases. Ch-47s were used primarily for hauling Class I, II, IV.and V items to the battalion fire support. Form
the fire support bases the resupply was carried to the rifle companies by UH-1E helicopters. No major problems were experienced in
the field of logistics during this operation.

b. Maintenance: The 11^th Brigade was supported by D Company 723 Maintenance Battalion for the first stays of the operation, then
Headquarters and A Company 723 Maintenance Battalion assumed the support requirement. For both units, the primary maintenance
mission involved vehicles, weapons, and radios. Lack of an adequate supply of repair parts caused some delays in getting equipment
repaired, however, these delays caused no serious problems.

c. Treatment and Evacuation of Casualties: Due to the size of the Brigade’s TACI, it was necessary to position evacuation helicopters
in Quang Ngai City to support the operation requirements. By placing the evacuation helicopters in Quang Nagai the response time
was greatly reduced. All combat casualties were treated in field locations and if required, evacuated to 91^st Evacuation Hospital in
Chu Lai. If the tactical situation required, additional medical evacuation helicopters could be obtained from Chu Lai Dust Off.

d. Transportation: Brigade units relied almost exclusively on organic transportation to meet the vehicle requirements throughout the
operation. When additional transportation assets were required, units could request support from the 23d Supply and Transportation
Battalion. Requests for additional transportation were forwarded to the brigade S-4 for approval and then submitted to 23d S&T
Battalion.

e. Communications: Due to the extreme size of the Brigade’s TAOI and the far reaching operations conducted during the reporting period,
it was necessary to establish “relay stations” at key points within the Brigade area to maintain effective communication. FM radio was
the primary means of communications from company to battalion to brigade and brigade to division. A VHF system provided “land-line” communications between brigade and battalions. RTT nets were also used during the operation to provide “hard copy” of important
messages. All units down to company level were equipped with “secure” radio capability and these systems were used extensively
during the operation.

14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: Extensive use was made of war dogs during the reporting period. Scout and tracker dogs
were used to detect the presents of enemy personnel and base areas, while mine dogs were used to detect the presence of enemy mines and
booby traps. Flame drops from CH-47 aircraft, were used to clear booby trapped areas and proved to be quite successful. The brigade also
tested several new items of equipment during this operation. The claymore triggering device was used to set up mechanical ambushes. This item
of equipment was considered to be less than satisfactory by most units of the brigade. The half-size smoke grenade and ground illumination
flare was also tested. These items were more favorably received by the field units however, some problem area were identified and reported.

15. COMMANDERS ANALYSIS:

a. Widely dispersed units, utilizing saturation patrols and ambushes to reduce the enemy’s ability to move generally characterized operations
during the reporting period. Snipers were employed along key lines of communications and met with tremendous success. The last two
months of the reporting period the brigade launched a series of operations in the western portions of the TAOI in support of the 4^th and
6^th ARVN Regiments. These operations were designed to disrupt the enemy supply routes and interdict his lines of communications.
A battalion forward CP and 105mm Howitzer were established on a forward fire base, while the rifle companies conducted security
operations around the position. Extensive use of eagle flights was made to increase the range and effectiveness of local patrolling. The
western operations proved very effective in disrupting enemy lines of communication and kept the enemy from launching any major
offensive during the reporting period.

b. Armored Cavalry was employed in the lowlands in conjunction with RF/PF forces. By using the mobility and fire power of the armored
cavalry to install confidence in the RFs and PFs the overall security of Quang Ngai Province was increased. These combined also
contributed greatly to the sources of the brigade rice denial program. Intelligence reports indicated that the rice denial program was
so successful in Quang Ngai Province that the 21^st NVA Regiment was forced to commit an entire battalion to the mission of rice
procurement.

c. Overall the operation must be termed a success. The Brigade successfully restricted the enemy ability to maneuver. The combined
operation conducted with the ARVN Regiments was highly successful in interdicting enemy supply routes and lines of communication.
The training assistance and operational support given to RF/PF forces also contributed to success of the operation.

16. RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that US units continue to conduct joint operations with ARVN and RF/PF forces. These operations
should require the Vietnamese forces to assume the major role, while US forces should be used to provide additional support as required.

WARNER S. GOODWIN, JR.

Colonel, Infantry

Commanding

ANNEX A (INTELLIGENCE) to Combat After Action Report Period 1 JUL-4OCT 1971

1. THE AREA OF OPERATION:

a. Weather: With the exception of a tropical storm in mid-July the weather during the 1 July-4 October operation was generally good. With little
or no adverse effect upon the execution of combat operations. During the later part of August and through September, air operations in the late
Part of August and through September, air operations in the late afternoon and evening in the mountainous regions were limited due to
thunder showers.

b. Terrain:

(1) This area of operation is art of the northern highlands of South Vietnam and is characterized by three types of terrain; the wide belt of
mountains in the west, a narrow transitional piedmont in the central portion of the AO, and the coastal plains in the past.

(a) The western portion of the AO consists of rugged, jungle-covered mountains rising to elevations in excess of 4,000 feet and intersected
by numerous small river valleys. This area offers maximum concealment while at the same time hindering foot movement of friendly
forces making complete searches of the area extremely difficult.

(b) The narrow piedmont consists of undulating hills compartments by numerous river valleys. These waterways extend like fingers from
the Eastern Highlands through the piedmont into the coastal plain. Throughout the piedmont, the hills range from 30 to 70 meters in
elevation, with slopes between 10 and 20 degrees.

(c) The coastal plains are a relatively flat strip, extending the length of the AO. The plains are interspersed with isolated hills and ridges
and are sectioned in many areas by rice paddies, border by dikes two to five feet high and eight to ten feet wide. The eastern edge of
the coastal plain consists of beaches covered by scattered scrub brush.

(2) The principle rivers are the Song Tre Bong, Song Tra Khuc, and Song VE which flow from West to East, and the Song RE and Dak
Selo which are in the western portion of the TAOI and flow North –South. The Houc Ong in the Northeastern portion of the TAOI flows
Northwest-Southeast and is the major infiltration route into the TAOI.

(3) Evergreen secondary forests are predominant in the mountains. Areas of grass and deciduous trees are interspersed throughout the
area and dry cultivation is widespread. Trees range in height from 25 to 30 meters, with a few as high as 50 meters. Tree canopy is continuous
in large areas. In the coastal plains, rice and dry crops are the main vegetation. Rice fields are flooded to depths of 6 to 18 inches and are
drained just prior to harvest in March and August. When mature rice a dense green grass, three to four feet tall. Villages and hamlets are
often surrounded by dense vegetation including thick hedges between houses.

(4) In the highlands, the key terrain is generally those sections of high ground from which control can be exerted over the valleys, The
cultivated areas and the road or trail networks on the valley floors. In the piedmont area, the key terrain is the high ground which
controls the valleys opening out to the east. On the coastal plains, key terrain features include the high ground and those locations
which control waterways, roads, and ports of entry.

2. ENEMY SITUATION:

(a) Estimated strength, location and disposition of enemy forces at the start of the operation:

UNIT STRENGTH LOCATION

21^ST NVA REGT HQ 300 BS4646

4^TH NVA BN 150 BS6349

5^TH NVA BN 150 BS4154

6^TH NVA BN 150 BS4440

402nd MF SAPPER BN 250 BS4092

403^RD NVA SAPPER BN 150 BS7924

406^TH MF SAPPER BN 200 BS7525

40^TH NVA SAPPER BN 100 BS7429

107^TH NVA HVY WPNS BN 168 BS4969

21^ST LF SAPPER CO. 70 BS4381

38^TH LF BN 160 BS7045

48 LF BN 200 BS3187

81^ST LF SAPPER CO 40 BS5874

95^TH A LF SAPPER CO 20 BS6398

95^TH B LF SAPPER CO 40 BS5393

506^TH A LF SAPPER CO 65 BS5377

120^TH MONTAGNARD 200 BS3184

C-18 LF CO 20 BS6558

C-19 LF CO 16 BS7457

C-25 LF CO 55 BS3666

C-45 LF SAPPER CO 25 BS7086

C-65 LF SAPPER CO 09 BS5265

C-75 LF SAPPER CO 40 BS7270

C-120 LF CO 30 BS8634

C-212LF CO 70 BS5337

C-219 LF CO 50 BS7841

K-51 LF HVY WPNS BN UNK BS6989

P-31 LF CO 20 BS6390

T-20 LF CO 25 BS7288

(b) Enemy Situation Anticipated:

(1) A continuation of the current policy of limited scale offensive activities utilizing NVA and Local Force units was anticipated in the TAOI. The activity was to be directed toward disruption of voting during the Lower House and Presidential elections and against the GVN pacification program. It would be characterized by enemy entrance into the densely populated areas to propagandizes to the people, collect taxes, terrorize the local population and the kidnap and assassination of RVN officials.

(2) A continuation to conduct harassing, stand-off attacks by in direct fire again both US and RVN installations as well as other government controlled areas. Such attacks could employ 60 and 81/82mm mortars, 57 and 75mm recoilless rifles, and 107, 122, and 140mm rockets.

(3) A continuation to deploy mines and boop-traps against US and RVN personnel, primarily in the coastal districts but also in protection of food and munitions caches in the western areas of the AO.

(4) A continuation to initiate and return fire against US aircraft, particularly in protection of rear base areas and supply caches. Enemy anti-air weapons range from small arms to 51 Cal MG and RPG’s.

(c)Enemy Situation Found: Several significant contacts were made early during this operation. All were combined operations, with 4^th and 6^th ARVN regiments participating. These contacts were with elements of the 240^th transpiration regiment and were centered around the Dak Selo River and Nuoc ONG River Corridor. These operations in the West netted over 15 tons of captured ammunition in a 60 day period, most of which was captured by ARVN troops. The enemy in the coastal lowlands and piedmont region avoided contact with US troops, as much as possible. The enemy concentrated almost entirely on food resupply during the operation and used the Song VE and Song Tra Khuc Rivers extensively to haul rice from the lowlands to cache sites in the mountains. Primary targets for enemy activities continued to be RF/PF OP’s, refugee camps and RVN installations. Assassination of VN officials, terrorist incidents and attacks by fire increased slightly during the Lower House Elections in late August and the Presidential Election in early October. The election period was also marked by numerous student and veterans demonstrations against the War. These demonstrations accrued frequently in population centers along HY-1. Enemy units showed a slight decrease in strength during this operation and there was one major unit were; that of the 406^th MF Sapper Bn from Northern Quang Ngai Province to Southern Quang Ngai Province vic BS7525. It is believed that this move was for food procurement.

Transcript by CHARLES S. SEKETA February 15, 2004

Transcript Check on March 12, 2006 by Charles S. Seketa

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